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The paper describes the evolution of the well-being of the Italians during the 150 years since the 
country’s unification. The progress in material standard of living was substantial, with GDP per 
capita growing 13 times between 1861 and 2010 and hours of work (and hence effort) falling 
considerably, but was roughly in line with that experienced by most other European countries. By 
relying on a novel database on household budgets, the paper shows that economic growth was 
accompanied by a long-run reduction of inequality that appears however to have been reversed in the 
last two decades. Progress was not limited to the economic domain: educational attainment improved 
considerably, although less than in other countries; on the other hand, the increase in life expectancy 
was spectacular and brought Italians to lead the international ranking.  
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1.  Introduction
1 
In 1861, a newborn Italian could expect to live for another 29 years. One and a half 
century later, life expectancy at birth has increased to 82 years, 84.8 for females and 79.3 for 
males. With a gain of 50 and more years over 150 years, Italians have climbed up to the top 
of the country ranking by life expectancy, and Italy stands among the best performers world-
wide. There is hardly any other indicator which is as effective as life expectancy to gauge in 
a single number the progress of a population. On this account, Italy since unification in 1861 
is undeniably a success story.  
Yet, this is hardly the end of the story. Human well-being is a multifaceted concept. 
Living longer is an achievement by itself, but it also matters how people do live. Access to 
consumer goods and leisure time, for instance, is important. The capability of choosing one’s 
own life is even more important. However significant, life expectancy cannot account for 
these different aspects of well-being, nor can do per capita income, another popular indicator 
of progress. On the other hand, any assessment based on average well-being is bound to 
ignore its distribution across the population. Our evaluation of the advancements in, say, the 
prevention of avoidable morbidity depends however on whether it is spread across the whole 
population or is instead concentrated among few wealthy individuals – even allowing for the 
difficulty to form ethical judgements about health inequalities stressed by Deaton (2011).  
Multidimensionality and distribution are the two keywords in our attempt to trace the 
path of the well-being of Italians since the country’s unification. We begin with an overview 
of the historical changes in income per capita, which is still the prime measure of economic 
development. We rely on a novel series recently estimated in a joint project by the Banca 
d’Italia, the Italian Central Statistical Office (Istat) and the University of Rome “Tor 
Vergata” and briefly compare it with the series calculated by Maddison (2001), which is that 
most frequently used in international historical comparisons. We integrate this description of 
the evolution of average income with information on its distribution, taking advantage of the 
new information available in the Italian Household Budget Dataset (Chianese and Vecchi 
2011).  
Income is a good measure of the command that people have over resources, and it is an 
important determinant of their standard of living, but it cannot capture all the diverse 
dimensions of human well-being. This observation is hardly new, although it has recently 
gained momentum thanks to the work of the European Commission (2009) and the 
Commission appointed by the French President Nicholas Sarkozy (Stiglitz, Sen and Fitoussi 
2009). Here, we go beyond GDP by considering the evolution of life expectancy and health 
outcomes, nutrition and dwellings, educational achievement, working and leisure time over 
the 150 years since Italy’s unification. We first analyse each dimension separately, and we 
then aggregate some of them into synthetic indices in order to reach definite conclusions 
where indicators move in a conflicting way.  
                                                 
1 We thank for useful comments Nicola Amendola, Luisa Minghetti, Gianni Toniolo and participants in the 
workshop “Italy’s International Economic Position, 1861-2011”, Perugia, Sadiba 10-11 December 2010. The 
views expressed here are solely ours; in particular, they do not necessarily reflect those of the Bank of Italy. 
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This broad set of variables will allow us not only to depict a nuanced view of the 
human progress of unified Italy. It will allow us to delve into the dynamics of this progress. 
Was it a smooth unfolding of long-run, mechanical and inescapable tendencies, or was it the 
outcome of a sequence of episodes (Atkinson 1997), alternating sharp advancements to stasis 
and, possibly, regressions? Did Italy sail with the international tide or did it succeed to surf 
the long wave of economic well-being due to the ability of expert skippers (Toniolo 2007)? 
It is through answering these questions that we can try to shed some lights on possible 
determinants of the long-run movements of well-being.  
2.  Material living conditions 
2.1  GDP per capita 
It would be far-fetched to identify well-being with income, but there is little doubt that 
command over resources is a fundamental determinant of living standards. As observed by 
Anand and Sen, “in an indirect way – both as a proxy and as a causal antecedent – the 
income of a person can tell us a good deal about her ability to do things that she has reason 
to value. As a crucial means to a number of important ends, income has, thus, much 
significance even in the accounting of human development” (2000, p. 100). Likewise, at the 
aggregate level, the total amount of incomes produced or enjoyed in a country, expressed in 
per capita terms, is a common measure of the prosperity of its population.
2 National 
accounts offer several aggregate income measures but, owing to data availability, we focus 
on gross domestic product (GDP).
3 Our reference series is the real GDP recently released as 
part of the reconstruction of the Italian historical national accounts jointly carried out by the 
Banca d’Italia, the Istat and the University of Rome “Tor Vergata” (BIU) (Baffigi 2011; 
Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi 2011). For international comparisons, we take the series 
elaborated by Maddison in his comparative research project on world economic growth 
(2001, 2003, 2010) and updated by Conference Board (2011). As shown in Figure 1, in 
general the two series differ marginally, though somewhat more significantly in the first half 
of the
                                                
 20th century. 
At the time of unification, the average income of Italians had hardly recovered from 
the stagnation of the previous three centuries: as estimated by Maddison, in 1861 GDP per 
capita was only 32 per cent above the level of 1500. For the post-unification years, the BIU 
series shows that its annual growth rate remained low throughout the 19th century, about 1.0 
per cent between 1861 and 1901, and only increased to 1.7 per cent between 1901 and 1913, 
prior to World War I. The inter-war period saw some slowdown of economic growth, which 
 
2 The use of national income as a measure of prosperity has become common after World War II, with the 
elaboration of national accounts. At the beginning of the 20th century, Italian scholars paid less attention to 
income than wealth, which was estimated either using information on estate duties or taking a direct inventory 
of assets and liabilities. This literature is surveyed by Zamagni (1980). 
3 Gross national income (GNI), its counterpart net of capital depreciation (NNI), or the household sector 
disposable income would be better measures, as they refer to the income that residents can spend instead to the 
income they have produced, but are only available for recent decades. The distinction between GDP and GNI 
makes little difference between 1970 and 2010, their respective annual per capita growth rates being 9.6 and 
9.5 per cent, but it should matter more back in time, when emigration and the inflow of remittances (included in 
GNI but not in GDP) were high. 
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however remained on average around 1.5 per cent per year despite the effects of the Great 
Depression. World War II hit severely Italian productive capacity, as most other European 
countries, and brought income per capita back to the early 1880s. The rapid post-war 
recovery, with the 1940 level reached by 1950, paved the way to the “economic miracle” of 
the 1950s and 1960s, when GDP per capita rose steadily by an average 5.6 per cent per year. 
The instability of the 1970s, marked by the oil shocks and a tough social conflict, led to a 
considerable slowdown, but annual income growth remained well above 3 per cent. The 
slowdown continued and intensified thereafter: GDP per capita rose by 2.4 per cent per year 
in the 1980s and by 1.5 in the 1990s, and eventually fell by 0.3 per cent per year in the 
2000s
little indication of 
Italian-specific growth miracles in Figure 2, at least in comparative terms. 
2.2 
. Household size decreased from 4.5 persons per unit in 1881 to 2.4 in 2010 
(Figu
, dragged down by the Great Recession of 2008-09. 
A glance at Figure 1 shows that the growth of average income was fairly slow after 
unification, and it took about 80 years to GDP per capita to double. After the destructions of 
World War II, the speed rose considerably, and income doubled once during the 1950s and a 
second time in the following fifteen years. Qualitatively this historical pattern is not different 
from that of other advanced countries, but Italy lags behind the top performers. Considering 
Maddison’s estimates as updated by Conference Board (2011), in 2010 the Italian GDP per 
capita equalled 62 per cent of the US level, just above the ratio for Spain (55 per cent), but 
well below those of other OECD countries, like Germany (68), France (71), the United 
Kingdom (73) or Sweden (80). While some changes have occurred in the rank order of 
countries, most notably the relative decline of the United Kingdom, Italy has overall shared 
the ups and downs of other countries (Crafts and Toniolo 2008). There is 
GDP per equivalent person 
Dividing aggregate income by the number of persons provides only a rough indication 
of average living standards. Two people living together do not need an income twice as large 
as the income they would need were they living alone. Living in a household generate 
economies of scale in consumption, as certain goods like housing space and heating can be 
shared. Moreover, needs differ by age, with children and the elderly typically needing less 
than adults, at least in terms of calorie intake. Thus, for a society like for a household, the 
demographic structure affects the standard of living achievable with a given income. Over 
the last 150 years changes in both age structure and average household size have been 
dramatic. The share of persons younger than 15 years fell from 34 to 14 per cent of the total 
population between the end of 1861 and the end of 2009, whereas the share of people older 
than 64 quintupled from 4 to 20 per cent (Figure 3). The “ageing index”, calculated as the 
number of persons 65 years old or over per hundred persons aged 14 or less, has increased 
by a factor of twelve between 1861 and 2010 (from 12 to 144 per cent), “making [Italy] the 
world’s “oldest” major country” at the onset of the third millennium (Kinsella and Phillips 
2005, p. 7)
re 4). 
To account for these demographic trends, we apply an “equivalence scale” and 
compute the number of “equivalent persons”, i.e. individuals who are made comparable in 
terms of needs (e.g. Coulter, Cowell and Jenkins 1992). Unfortunately, we do not have the 
household-level information that would allow us to make these adjustments simultaneously. 
Thus, we carry out two separate calculations for age and household size. First, we compute 
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the number of equivalent adults by weighting all individuals by their relative nutritional 
needs: EAt=Σawamat, where mat is the number of persons in the age class a in year t and wa is 
the cost of the dietary requirements for a person in the age class a as a ratio to the same cost 
for an adult in the age class 18-59.
4 Second, we adjust for household size and calculate the 
number of equivalent persons living alone: EPt=Σhh
1–θnht,, where nht is the number of 
households with h members in year t and θ measures economies of scale in consumption. 
When θ equals 0, there are no economies of scales and EPt equals the total population; when 
θ is greater than 0, the number of equivalent persons is below the actual number of persons, 
as the weight of co-residents is scaled down by a factor corresponding to the savings in 
consumption implied by living together relative to living alone. We take θ equal to ½, a 
value often used in income distribution analysis (e.g. Atkinson, Rainwater and Smeeding 
1995)
lfare implications are not 
easily captured by a mechanical application of equivalence scales. 
                                                
.  
GDP per equivalent person exceeds GDP per capita in either versions (Figure 4). 
When we adjust for the age structure, this happens because children and the elderly are 
weighted less than adults. Despite the remarkable changes in the demographic pyramid 
shown in Figure 3, the difference between GDP per capita and GDP per equivalent adult is 
very small; it only widens slightly in the last decades, but not in a way sufficient to alter the 
overall income profile. The effects are far more evident when we consider the secular 
reduction in the household size. The gains from pooling and sharing goods and services 
within the household, which explain the difference between equivalised and non-equivalised 
GDP, diminish over time, since the 1920s. Thus, the eleven-fold increase of GDP per capita 
between 1881 and 2010 would turn into an eight-fold rise of GDP per equivalent person. 
This observation should not be overplayed. First, at earlier stages of development, 
expenditure is higher on goods characterized by low economies of scale like food than on 
those characterized by greater economies of scale like housing (Deaton 1997). This would 
lead to assume that θ rises over time, so that the discrepancy between equivalised and non-
equivalised GDP would be proportionally lower at the beginning than at the end of the 
period, muting and possibly reversing the impact on the growth rate. Second, and more 
importantly, the secular movements towards a smaller household size reflects, by and large, 
a people’s choice. Thus, the lower economies of scale in consumption must have been more 
than offset, in welfare terms, by the greater independence allowed by living in small family 
units. Exit from the family of origin and household formation reflect cultural factors (Reher 
1998, Giuliano 2007), but crucially depends also on economic feasibility, as confirmed by 
the “doubling-up” of US households since the Great Recession of 2008-09 (DeNavas-Walt, 
Proctor and Smith 2011). The fall in household size is an important feature of the evolution 
of quality of life in Italy, as in other advanced countries, and its we
 
4 The valuation of the cost of dietary requirements by age utilises the estimations carried out to construct the 
absolute poverty line and refers to prices prevailing in 2005 (Istat 2009, Table 3.10, p. 39). For instance, the 
relative weights are 0.62 for children younger than 5 years, 0.86 for children aged 5 to 9 years, and 0.82 for 
individuals older than 74. 
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2.3  Worked time 
As early as in 1952, Kuznets denounced that the long-run reduction in hours worked, 
that is, the secular increase in the consumption of leisure, was one of those aspects that 
economists had “… overlooked, or, if recognized, dismissed lightly because they lie outside 
the boundaries of economic discipline, as narrowly defined. The neglect or dismissal of these 
problems is likely to be more detrimental to the understanding of the process of economic 
growth than even crude attempts to deal with them” (1952, pp. 63-64). In the same vein, 
Nordhaus and Tobin later remarked that “the omission of leisure and of nonmarket 
productive activity from measures of production conveys the impression that economists are 
blindly materialistic. Economic theory teaches that welfare could rise, even while NNP [net 
national product] falls, as the result of voluntary choices to work for pay fewer hours per 
week, weeks per year, years per lifetime” (1972, p. 9). Nordhaus and Tobin suggested a 
three-step procedure to adjust GDP not only for leisure and home production, but also to 
imput




e services of consumer durable goods and to exclude components constituting 
investment rather than consumption, and to correct for negative externalities associated with 
urbanization.  
The reduction in worked hours may take many dimensions: later entry in the labour 
market, as years spent in full-time education rise; shorter working days or weeks; longer 
holiday leaves; early retirement, relative to residual life expectancy. Together with the rise in 
the length of life, all these changes have gone in the direction of reducing the share of 
lifetime devoted to work, diminis
o carry out a systematic adjustment of GDP for the reduction in worked hours along the 
lines suggested by Kuznets, Nordhaus and Tobin, but we can examine two relevant aspects: 
child labour and working hours.  
Available evidence suggests that child work was widespread in most European 
countries during the 18th and 19th centuries (Cunningham and Viazzo 1996). According to 
Toniolo and Vecchi (2007) and Cinnirella, Toniolo and Vecchi (2011), Italy was no 
exception, with about 80 per cent of children aged 10 to 14 years being classified as 
economically active at the time of the country’s unification (Figure 5). Industrialization was 
however accompanied by a decline in child work, unlike in many other countries.
5 This 
decline proceeded rapidly throughout the whole period, except for a stasis between the two 
world wars, and even an increase in the aftermath of the Great Depression (1931-36). These 
estimates, which are based on census results, contradict the pessimist conclusion of the 
Parliamentary Commission of Inquiry into Unemployment that “... in the course of Italy
mic development, the employment of children in workplaces has steadily increased 
during its early phases” (Spesso 1953, p. 171). They are also considerably lower than the 
figures reported in some international comparisons of child work (ILO 1996; Basu 1999).  
It is not easy to reconstruct the historical movements in working time, not least for the 
large variability across sectors and occupations. The selection of data reported in Figure 6 
mostly refers to manual workers in industry, including construction. From 1870 to 1913, 
Huberman (2004) estimates a virtual stability on the basis of cross-national data on factory 
                                                 
5 See, among others, De Herdt (1996) and Puissant (1976) for Belgium, Goldin and Sokoloff (1982) for the US, 
Horrel and Humphries (1995) and Tuttle (1998) for the UK. 
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conditions gathered by the U.S. Department of Labor (1900) from official sources.
6 Time 
spent at work did not vary much during Liberal Italy, so that the gains in well-being as 
measured by the GDP per capita were not offset by a concomitant increase in the effort 
required to produce it. The calculations by Zamagni (1975, 1994) show a temporary rise of 
work-time during World War I, followed by a sharp fall around 1919, when the 8-hours per 
day, or 48-hours per week, were adopted. Further reductions followed until the outbreak of 
World War II. As noted by Zamagni (1975), Mussolini introduced a number of exceptions 
(e.g. in 1926 employers were allowed to raise the limit from 8 to 9 hours per day), but their 
overall effect was short-lived and small in size. According to the survey of industrial 
establishments carried out by Ministero del Lavoro and Istat’s business survey, working time 
slightly rose in the aftermath of World War II, stabilised during the 1950s, and then declined 
until early 1980s. Thereafter, Istat’s national accounts figures for all employees, rather than 
blue-collars only, indicate a flat trend, except for the abrupt drop during the Great Recession 
of 2008-09. The Conference Board’s (2011) series for the total economy, which consistently 
extends Istat’s national account series back to 1950, exhibits a substantially similar pattern, 
but at a higher level because it also covers the self-employed, who typically work longer 
hours. Nowadays, the average employed works more in Italy than in the United States, or in 
the U
hen expressed per worker, and is 
only slightly below when expressed per capita (Figure 7).  
  
nited Kingdom, France, or Germany.
7 
When we consider the work effort relative to the whole population rather than the 
employed only, we may expect to observe similar long-run tendencies, but reinforced by the 
evolution of labour market participation at different ages. Both the reduction in child labour 
and the ageing of population, when not accompanied by a corresponding elevation of 
retirement age, would imply an additional fall in hours of work per person, besides that due 
to shorter work-time. Indeed, Kuznets (1966, p. 75) calculates a significant long-run 
decrease in the number of man-hours per capita (as opposed to per worker) in thirteen 
advanced economies, ranging from 1.1 per cent per decade in Great Britain (1870-1952) to 
4.5 per cent in the Netherlands (1900-1952), and to an “exceptional” 7.5 per cent in Italy 
(1901-1953). According to the Conference Board’s (2011) data, the fall continued until the 
1970s; it was then reversed in the mid-1990s, as labour market participation begun rising 
again. The post-war trend in hours of work is in Italy similar to those of the other main 
European countries, although somewhat less pronounced. It is a popular view that Europeans 
work less than Americans, owing to higher tax rates (Prescott 2004), the role of unions and 
labour market regulations (Alesina, Glaeser and Sacerdote 2006), or sheer preferences for 
leisure rather than income (Blanchard 2004; for a survey, see Gordon 2010). Huberman and 
Minns (2007) contend that this work-time divergence is a long-run phenomenon. Yet, this 
view does not appear to fit well the Italian data. Taking the United States as the benchmark, 
it is true that since 1960 hours of work dropped more rapidly in Italy than in the United 
States, but their average level remains above the US level w
                                                
refer Huberman’s figures to those estimated by Maddison (1964), because the latter depend on many 
untested assumptions, such as taking hours of work per week in Italy to be the same as in Great Britain (see 
6 We p
Huberman 2004, pp. 967-8). 
7 The evidence provided by Ausubel and Grüber (1995) suggests that Italy’s historical record follows, by and 
large, the pattern of most European countries. 
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2.4  Summing up 
The average income of Italians increased 13 times since unification, somewhat less if 
we take into account the diseconomies in consumption due to the fall in household size, 
somewhat more if we consider the lower effort (and higher leisure) brought about by the fall 
ial growth, which has allowed Italians to improve 
s of living, but one no more spectacular than that 
exper
 1976, p. 20) by adopting the axiomatic 
appro
ion of income and 
lly-adjusted value. 
Befor
ped and legislators had created national 
                                                
in hours of work. It is a substant
considerably their material standard
ienced by most other European countries or Western Offshoots.  
3.  Beyond average incomes  
GDP per person ignores the distribution of income across people. However, the 
welfare of a community arguably depends not only on total income, but also on the way in 
which it is distributed among its members. As put by Dalton (1920, p. 349), “the objection to 
great inequality of incomes is the resulting loss of potential economic welfare”. In Dalton’s 
utilitarian approach, social welfare equals the sum (or mean) across individuals of identical 
concave utility functions, where income is the argument. Social welfare is maximised when 
income is equally distributed, and inequality can be identified with the shortfall from this 
maximum value. Following Atkinson (1970), we can measure this welfare loss in the income 
space by means of the “equally-distributed equivalent income”, that is the level of income 
YE which would give the same level of social welfare as the given distribution when equally 
assigned to all individuals. By construction, YE is lower than mean income μ, and inequality 
can be measured by the index A=1–YE/μ. By inverting this expression, we see that YE=μ(1–
A) is an evaluation of the standard of living allowed by income level μ after adjusting for the 
distribution of income among people.
8 Alternatively, distributional judgements can be made 
“an integral part of real income evaluation” (Sen
ach proposed by Sen, which leads to the measure of economic welfare W=μ(1–G), 
where G is the Gini index.
9 Despite the different theoretical bases, YE and W have the same 
structure and only differ for the inequality index.  
In this Section, we investigate the secular changes in the distribut
assess how the dynamics of GDP per capita differ from its distributiona
e doing that, we summarise a novel database used in this assessment.  
3.1  Data problems and the Italian Household Budget Dataset 
Ever since scholars turned their attention to the estimation of long-run changes in the 
personal distribution of income, the lack of suitable data has represented a major obstacle. 
Modern household surveys began after World War II, once the statistical theory and method 
to construct representative samples had been develo
 
8 The value YE is obtained by assuming a specific shape of the individual function of income which enters the 
social welfare function. As stressed by Atkinson (1983, p. 5) this individual function need not be interpreted as 
utility, since social welfare is defined on income. If we take an iso-elastic function, we have YE=[Σiyi
(1–ε)/n]
1/(1–
ε) for ε>0 and ε≠1 and YE =Πiyi
1/n for ε=1, where the sub-index i refers to individuals and ε is a free parameter 
capturing the aversion to inequality (see below).  
9 Dagum (1990) suggests the alternative formulation W=μ(1–G)/(1+G), which is somewhat more sensitive to 




ten 2005) to the construction of “social 
tables
1; subsequently, we use the data collected by Istituto Doxa 
(Doxa
all in all, the dynamics of the two series appear to be sufficiently close. Table 1 also reports 
the Gini index and the Atkinson index for the distribution of per capita incomes over the 
                                                
ical offices (Stapleford 2009). Prior to World War II, data at the individual or 
household level required to estimate the evolution of the personal distribution of income are 
scarce and inadequate (Stigler 1954; Deaton 1997). 
The major drawback of early data is their limited coverage, either of the population or 
of the income concept (Deaton and Zaidi 2002). This problem characterises income data 
drawn from tax files since Pareto’s (1895) pioneering study of the revenue curve. Their 
representativeness is improved by the adjustment to income and population totals derived 
from external sources, pioneered by Kuznets (1953) and recently revived by Atkinson, 
Piketty and co-authors (Atkinson and Piketty, eds., 2007 and 2010). In this literature, 
however, inequality can only be measured by the income shares of top income earners. The 
statistical material is also limited and fragmented in the analysis of the long-run evolution of 
inequality in the United States (Williamson and Lindert 1980) and the United Kingdom 
(Williamson 1985), despite the many sources employed. Other investigators have searched 
for an alternative to household budgets and income data exploring a number of indirect 
indicators, ranging from heights (Moradi and Ba
” (Milanovic 2006; Milanovic, Lindert and Williamson 2010).
10 Despite the 
eclecticism and the ingenuity of approaches, the paucity of suitable data has prevented the 
analysis of long-run change of income inequality. 
For Italy, however, we can rely on a novel and innovative database. Data on household 
budgets have been collected in thousands, in various forms, from the unification till the early 
1960s (Niceforo 1933; Somogyi 1959; Vecchi 1994), when the modern surveys run by the 
Istat and the Bank of Italy became systematic. A first collection of about 4,700 household 
budgets over the years 1881-1961 led to the Italian Household Budget Database (IHBD-I), 
which was employed by Rossi, Toniolo and Vecchi (2001) to produce long-run statistics on 
expenditure inequality. Here, we use the income data of the new version of the dataset, 
IHBD-II, which includes around 20,000 household budgets, as described by Chianese and 
Vecchi (2011). These data are used to construct “samples” centred around census years. 
Census data provide the information needed to compute the weights (“expansion factors”) 
used to post-stratify the income information and correct for the potential biases arising from 
the lack of a probabilistic survey design (Holt and Smith 1979; Little 1993).
11 The IHBD-II 
data cover the period 1861-193
) for 1948, and from the Bank of Italy in its Survey of Household Income and Wealth 
(SHIW) from 1967 onwards (tabulated data until 1976 and microdata thereafter; on the latter 
sources, see Brandolini 1999).  
Summary information on our household-level data are reported in Table 1. The 
comparison with GDP per capita figures shows systematic source-related discrepancies, but, 
 
10 See also Lindert (2000), Williamson (2002) and Brenner, Kaelble and Thomas, eds (1991). The rationale of 
some of these indicators, on both theoretical and empirical grounds, is discussed by Engerman (1997). 
11 The weights are the population shares resulting from the breakdown by area of residence (North-West, 




period 1861-2008. Distributive statistics were estimated by fitting, for each available year, a 
four-parameter functional form, the Generalized Beta of the Second Kind (GB2) discussed 
by Jenkins (2009).
12 
Long-run dynamics of inequality and distributionally-adjusted GDP per 
capit
so of the Atkinson index 
with ε
 “... it may be better ... to think in terms of ‘episodes’ 
when
                                                
3.2 
a 
Figure 8 shows the secular trend of income inequality in Italy, as measured by the Gini 
and the Atkinson index.
13 The latter requires the specification of the parameter ε that 
measures the aversion to inequality: the higher ε, the more weight we attach to transfers at 
the bottom of the distribution relative to transfers at the top; in the extreme case where ε 
tends to infinity, only the income of the poorest individual would matter. We consider three 
values of ε, 0.125, 1 and 2), which should cover a wide range of social preferences. There 
are local divergences in the movements of the four indices, in particular between the 
Atkinson index most sensitive to changes at the bottom of the distribution (ε=2) and the 
others. However, except for a notable divergence in the period 1921-1931, the overall story 
appears to be fairly consistent across the four indices. (This is true al
=0.125, whose variations are dwarfed by the common scale.) 
During the first seventy years since unification the Gini index has been fluctuating 
within a relatively narrow band, between 45 and 50 per cent. Eighty years later, it has 
decreased by 12-18 percentage points to around 33 per cent, although the historical 
minimum was reached, at about 30 per cent, in the early 1980s. Even allowing for statistical 
errors, the long-run trend is unambiguously downwards: Italy’s modern economic growth 
has been accompanied by a narrowing of the distribution of income. This process has not 
been linear, however, and it is better described as a sequence of periods alternating gentle 
declines to stasis or sharp drops to sudden rises, consistently with Atkinson’s (1997, p. 303) 
observation that “... it is misleading to talk of ‘trends’ when describing the postwar evolution 
of the income distribution”, whilst
 inequality fell or increased”. 
During the early stages of industrialisation the Gini index stalled. The increase 
between 1871 and 1901 is not negligible, although probably not statistically significant, and 
is by and large offset by the reduction between 1901 and 1921. There is no evidence of the 
inverted-U shaped curve that Kuznets (1955) suggested should emerge along the process of 
industrialisation. Rather, the evidence seems consistent with the hypothesis of a “benign 
industrialization” conjectured by Toniolo (2003) and Vecchi (2003). In this respect, Italy’s 
experience appears to differ from those of the United States and the United Kingdom. 
According to Lindert (2000), “income and wealth inequality definitely rose over the first 150 
years of US history. Britain may also have had an early period of rising inequality, but the 
 
12 The parametric estimation, by maximum likelihood, was chosen to minimize the impact of differences in 
sources and to mitigate the influence of irregularities, especially for the 19th century data. In addition to 
providing statistical robustness, the GB2 function allowed us to deal with grouped data (Doxa and early 
SHIW). Parametric and non-parametric estimates are instead virtually identical when using microdata. See 
Amendola, Brandolini and Vecchi (2011) for further details. 
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likely period of rising inequality (1740-1810) was earlier than most writers have 
imagined” (Lindert 2000, p. 169). 
While income distribution tended to narrow during the two episodes of more intense 
economic growth, the Giolitti’s years prior to World War I and the post World War II years 
of the so called “economic miracle”, it was between the end of the 1960s and the early 1980s 
that the fall in inequality was more pronounced, with a sharp drop of the Gini index by more 
than 10 percentage points. This fall was driven by a strong compression in the distribution of 
labour incomes, which was reinforced by the expansion of the welfare state (Amendola, 
Brandolini and Vecchi 2011). This “egalitarian phase”
me direction, if not of the same size, took place for instance in France, Germany, 
Sweden and Finland (Brandolini and Smeeding 2008). 
The downward trend reversed since the early 1980s. In particular, inequality rose 
during the severe economic and currency crises of the early 1990s, when the Gini index 
abruptly went back to the levels 
unced than in other countries, particularly the United States and the United Kingdom 
(Brandolini and Smeeding 2008).  
The fall in inequality amplifies the extent of the economic progress of Italians since 
unification. As shown in Figure 9, the overall increase of economic welfare is always larger 
for the distributionally-adjusted measures of real income. The improvement is modest when 
we take Atkinson’s equally-distributed equivalent income with ε equal to 0.125, which is not 
surprising in the light of the modest weight assigned to inequality in the social welfare 
function. For higher values of ε or for the Gini index, the increase of the distributionally-
adjusted GDP per capita is far more con
sts an 18-fold increase of economic welfare between 1861 and 2008 instead of the 13-
fold rise indicated by GDP per capita.  
Whereas the overall tendency appears to be sufficiently robust, its exact size and the 
movements within sub-periods are somewhat more uncertain. With this caveat in mind, in 
Figure 10 we compare the annual growth rates in five sub-periods of GDP per capita, both 
unadjusted and adjusted for either the Gini index or the Atkinson index with ε equal to 2 
(which magnifies the sensitiveness to the bottom of the distribution). In the first half a 
century since unification, differences among the three measures are small, owing to the 
modest changes of the income distribution. During the next period, encompassing the two 
World Wars, the growth of economic well-being is stronger after accounting for distribution. 
The growth in the two decades following World War II is dominated by the dynamics of 
GDP per capita. While the Gini-adjusted measure indicates an even faster growth, the 
Atkinson-adjusted measure points however in the opposite direction: this seems to suggest 
that the entire income distribution became less unequal during the years of the “economic 
miracle” thanks to the gains of the middle class, while the bottom of the distribution lost 
 
14 Available information does not yet allow us to assess changes during the Great Recession of 2008-09. 
According to simulations by Brandolini, D’Amuri and Faiella (2011), there was some widening of the income 
distribution, but of a relatively modest size. Combined with the low economic growth, the upward trend in 
inequality of the past two decades has brought about a deterioration of vulnerability and absolute poverty 
indicators (Amendola, Salsano and Vecchi 2011; Rossi and Vecchi 2011). 
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butive changes partly compensated the slow-down of economic growth during the 
1970s and 1980s, but then augmented the further slow-down recorded since the early 1990s. 
3.3  Summing up 
Italy’s modern economic growth has been accompanied by a noticeable narrowing of 
the distribution of income. Hence, distributionally-adjusted GDP per capita appears to have 
increased more rapidly than the unadjusted 
economic welfare attributable to falling inequality depends
preferences. Since the early 1990s, the widening of the inco
depressed an already decelerating growth rate. 
4.  Life expectancy and GDP-augmented measures 
We mentioned at the beginning the enormous advancement in the Italians’ life expectancy. 
Two questions arise naturally. Did this advancement proceed at a speed and with a timing 
similar to those of material living conditions? How can we combine the improvements in 
both dimensions to arrive at a comprehensive evaluation of the progress in well-being? One 
way to answer the second question is to construct a measure of GDP per capita adjusted for 
life expectancy, as suggested by Usher (1973); a secon
construction of the Human Development Index. Before considering thes
turn to the first question and describe the evolution of health conditio
ation (see also Atella, Francisci and Vecchi 2011). 
4.1  Life expectancy at birth, infant mortality and male heights 
The increase of life expectancy at birth in Italy stands out in the international 
comparison (Figure 11). In the liberal period, from 1861 to 1913, the advancement is rapid 
and sizeable, and Italy almost catches up with France. Changes are in line with those in other 
countries during the fascist period, but after World War II they are more substantial than 
elsewhere, and Italy overtakes most countries. According to the last international estimates, 
Italians can expect to live longer than any other world citizen except for the Japanese (World 
Health Organisation 2011). The rise in life expectancy shows conspicuous differences 
between sexes. Towards the end of the 19th century, there was virtually no difference 
between males and females. Life expectancy then begun to improve fas
en: the gap widened to almost 7 years in about a century, before starting to close again 
in the 1990s. This time pattern is common to other countries, although sex differences are no 
longer the least pronounced among the countries considered (Figure 12). 
The improvement in life expectancy is largely explained by that in infant mortality.
15 
In Figure 13 we compare the long-run series for Italy of the infant mortality rate, defined as 
the number of deaths within the first year of life per 1,000 live births, with those for other 
countries using the data assembled by Mitchell (2008). In 1863, this rate equalled 290 in 
 
15 Infant mortality is a good indicator of a country’s level of development. It is included by Morris (1979) in the 
calculation of the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI), a progenitor of many composite indices of well-being. 
The estimates of the PQLI by Federico and Toniolo (1991) show that Italy in 1910 lagged behind the United 
Kingdom, France and Belgium by about 40 years. 
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Italy, slightly less than in Germany, but considerably more than in France and England and 
Wales, despite the higher income level of latter countries. Infant mortality fell quickly after 
the unification, mainly thanks to the reduction in mortality due to infectious diseases, but in 
1910 it was still above the levels that we observe today in the poorest countries of the world, 
like Sierra Leone, Liberia or Angola. The infrastructure of public health was still 
underdeveloped at the end of the 19th century, and this is likely to have prevented Italy from 
absorbing more rapidly the excess mortality, especially among the youngest cohorts: the 
deaths caused by diarrhoea and enteritis – negatively correlated with the presence of public 
health facilities – were considerably higher in Italy than in other countries (Caselli 1991). 
The convergence towards the French and British values slowed down during world wars, and 
in the mid-1970s the infant mortality rate still exceeded those of other richer countries. 
However, in 2008 it has fallen to 3.3, a value slightly higher than in Japan, Sweden or 
Finland (around 2.5), but lower than in France (3.6), Germany (3.5), Australia (4.3), United 
Kingdom (4.7), and the United States (6.7) (University of California Berkeley and Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2010). Until recently, however, infant mortality 
has b
 United Kingdom and the United States 
(Williamson 1981; Komlos 1998; Steckel 2008). A’Hearn and Vecchi (2011) confirm that 
the national-level evidence extends to the north-western regions where industrialization was 
most intense (Piedmont, Lombardy and Liguria). 
                                                
een persistently higher for out-of-the-wedlock births, which may be seen as evidence of 
the less adequate health conditions of poorer classes, where these births are more common 
(Manfredini and Pozzi 2004; Tizzano 1965; Toniolo and Vecchi 2010). 
Data on people’s height can offer further insights into the well-being of a population, 
particularly in periods for which we lack more informative sources (e.g. Fogel, Engerman 
and Trussel 1982). Though the variation of individual heights is dominated by randomly 
distributed genetic potential, variations over time or across socioeconomic groups are driven 
by systematic differences in diet, disease environment, workload, and health care. To the 
extent that these are functions of real income, mean heights provide indirect clues about 
living conditions.
16 According to the statistical reconstruction by A’Hearn and Vecchi 
(2011), the average male height steadily grew by almost a centimetre per decade between the 
cohort born in 1861 and the cohort born in 1980. The gain is roughly in line with the 
experience of other European countries.
17 Interestingly, Italy does not appear to have 
experienced any period of declining heights such as those which are typically associated 
with the disamenities of industrialisation in the
 
16 Data on heights typically come from administrative military records, which suffer from various 
comparability problems (e.g. varying age at measurement, rounding and heaping, selection due to recruitment 
procedures, truncation due to minimum height requirements). Arcaleni (1998, 2006) provides a detailed 
account of the procedure by which conscripts were measured as they turned 20 and underwent the physical 
examinations to ascertain fitness for military service. With the end of conscription in 2005, this information is 
unavailable for people born after 1980. Heights of Italian conscripts have been also studied by Costanzo 
(1948), Terrenato and Ulizzi (1983), Federico (2003), A’Hearn (2003, 2006) and A’Hearn, Peracchi and 
Vecchi (2009). 
17 According to Hatton and Bray (2010), from the 1870s to the 1970s average height increased by more than 1 
centimetre per decade in a group of 15 Western European countries. The rise in Italy was estimated at 1.07 
centimetres per decade, against less than 1 in Ireland, France and the United Kingdom, but 1.2 or more in 
Spain, Germany and the Netherlands. 
 
16 
4.2  GDP per capita adjusted for life expectancy 
  As noted by Usher, “if you ask a man whether he prefers economic conditions as they 
are today to those of fifty or a hundred years ago, he would probably answer that he prefers 
conditions as they are today, and his preference might have less to do with the material 
things we possess than with the fact that we live longer” (1973, pp. 193-94). Building on this 
consideration, Usher (1973, 1980) proposed a method to correct GDP per capita for 
longevity to obtain a better measure of well-being. He derived the measure 
LEAt=GDPt(Lt/L0)
1/, where Lt is the average life expectancy taken across all ages j weighted 
by their population shares pj0 in the base year 0: Lt=Σjpj0Ljt. The j-specific life expectancy in 
year t is defined as Ljt=Σi=j,…,110[k=j,…,i–1(1–Dkt)(1–Dit/2)]/(1+r)
i–j, where Dit is the mortality 
rate at age i in year t and r is the subjective discount rate. The parameter β is the elasticity of 
annual utility with respect to consumption: the higher β, the lower the weight assigned to life 
expectancy. Indeed, the growth rate of LEAt equals that of GDP per capita plus 1/β times the 
growth rate of life expectancy. Note that “Usher’s model offers what appears to be an upper 
bound on the growth in ‘true’ living standards accruing for mortality decline” (Williamson 
1984, p. 162), as improvements in life expectancy are unrealistically taken to be completely 
exogenous and independent of income growth. 
This method is data intensive, as it requires yearly life tables for the entire population. 
We compute the annual series for LEAt for Italy from 1872 to 2008 using the Istat life tables 
as assembled in the Human Mortality Database (University of California Berkeley and Max 
Planck Institute for Demographic Research 2010). We take r=0.05 and the same three values 
of β (0.25, 0.3 and 0.45) considered by Usher (1973), Williamson (1984) and Costa and 
Steckel (1997). As shown in Figure 14, by allowing for the increasingly longer lives of 
Italians, the estimated progress in well-being rises considerably relative to considering solely 
GDP per capita. The extent of the progress depends, however, on the value of β: from 1873 
to 2008, GDP adjusted for life expectancy rose 40 times when β is set equal to 0.25 but only 
24 times when β is equal to 0.45 (13 times for GDP per capita). Whatever the value assigned 
to β, the consequences of embodying the gains in longevity in our evaluation are stronger 
during liberal Italy, due to the faster improvement in life expectancy: between 1873 and 
1913, LEAt grew by 2.3 per cent per year against 1.1 per cent of GDP per capita, taking 
β=0.25.
18 The increase in life expectancy contributes less to overall growth during fascism 
and after World War II.  
4.3  Summing up 
Life expectancy has increased rapidly since Italy’s unification, at a faster pace than in 
most other advanced countries. This result was achieved despite some lag in decreasing 
infant mortality. The progress in well-being appears to be far more sizeable when economic 
growth is combined with the improvement in health conditions. 
                                                 
18 For the first decades after unification, our estimates are more positive than those obtained by Crafts (1997). 
See also Huberman (2004) and Crafts and Toniolo (2008) for other applications to few benchmark years. 
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5.  Educational achievements and the Human Development Index 
Education is a third important dimension of human well-being. School qualification 
has its own place as an important determinant of social status, but we mainly regard it as a 
proxy of the capacity of persons to function, to comprehend and operate in the outside 
environment to do the things they value. A way to account for the education together with 
income and life expectancy is to compute the secular series of the Human Development 
Index (HDI). The HDI is probably the single most popular composite index in the field of 
development economics. Since its introduction in 1990 (UNDP 1990), practitioners as well 
as scholars have been fascinated by the possibility of capturing the many dimensions of well-
being into a single index easily comprehensible to the general public. This “eye-catching 
property”, as labelled by Streeten (1994), has been crucial for the HDI to successfully 
challenge per capita income as the sole measure of development. In this section, we first 
describe the educational achievements of Italians and then examine the secular evolution of 
the HDI. 
5.1  Education and child labour 
Italy’s current record in educational achievement is rather poor, be it measured by 
school attainment levels or by proficiency scores in surveys such as PISA or TIMMS. 
According to Morrisson and Murtin (2009), the situation was not too different in 1870, when 
Italy stood out as a laggard among most other comparable countries: with less than one year 
of schooling, Italians were far away from the achievements of the leaders – US (5.6 years), 
Germany (5.5), France and UK (4) – but also from those many backward countries – Spain 
(2.4), Japan (1.7) and Greece (1.5).
19 This is picture consistent not only with many studies in 
the literature (Zamagni 1993; Checchi 1997), but also with the testimony of contemporary 
commentators. Of particular interest is the appraisal by the historian Bolton King and his 
collaborator Thomas Okey – authors of Italy Today published in 1901: “Education is the 
gloomiest chapter in Italian social history, a chapter of painful advance, of national 
indifference to a primary need, of a present backwardness, that gives Italy (next to Portugal) 
the sad primacy of illiteracy in Western Europe” (King and Okey 1901, p. 233). These were 
not words by two (of the many) foreigners eager to write travel memories even if the absence 
of any understanding of the Italian matters, but rather a qualified opinion: Bolton King was 
an educational administrator and historian very acquainted with the Italian society. 
Moreover, in writing Italy Today King and Okey benefited from the consultation with a large 
number of eminent figures. The list includes Luigi Bodio (Head of the Statistical Office), 
Luigi Einaudi and Antonio de Viti de Marco (economists), in addition to a crowd of 
members of the Parliament (“onorevoli”) (Giustino Fortunato, Filippo Turati and Leonida 
Bissolati to quote only a few), academic scholars (e.g. Cesare Lombroso, Francesco Nitti and 
Pasquale Villari), journalists, nobles (e.g. the Countess Pasolini), bankers, and many other 
experts in various fields. 
Italy’s secular performance can be better appreciated by comparing the new estimates 
of the gross enrolment rate (GER) for primary education made available by A’Hearn, Auria 
and Vecchi (2011) with those by Lindert (2007). Figure 15 shows the trend over the years 
                                                 
19 The data refer to the population aged between 15 and 64. 
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1860-1930 of the GERs for selected countries. Italy’s position is pretty stable at the bottom 
of ranking, outperformed even by Greece – a country with a GDP per capita about a half of 
that of Italy’ in 1860 – that succeeds in catching up with Italy and eventually overcoming it. 
Nor did Italy catch up with Spain, despite its higher level of GDP per capita. King and Okey 
had little hesitation in identifying the causes of Italy’s poor record: “There have been thirty-
three Education Ministers since 1860, each eager to distinguish himself by upsetting his 
predecessor’s work. Money has been stinted, and State and communes, lavish in all else, 
have economized in the most fruitful of national investments.” (p. 233). Despite the Casati 
law was in place from the first day of the Kingdom of Italy, it seems it remained a dead-
letter. “Prosecutions for non-attendance are probably unknown, and a head-inspector reports 
that he has never heard of one”. (p. 235). 
The evidence on literacy rates is fully in agreement with the picture outlined by the 
GERs: at the time of unification Italy’s illiteracy rates were as high as nearly 80 per cent 
(with a gender gap of circa 14 per cent in favour of males) and it took a surprisingly long 
time for Italy to catch up with other countries. According the 2001 population census, 
illiteracy has been eradicated from the country, even though many observers are drawing 
attention to other forms of illiteracy, more appropriate to the present day.  
The explanatory power of enrolment rates is weakened by the fact that part of enrolled 
pupils are not attending school. The lack of a long-run time series on attendance rates 
prevents us from estimating the gap between the two series. The evidence gathered by 
A’Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011) suggests that approximately 20 per cent of enrolled 
pupils did not attend school at the end of the 19th century, with a gender gap equal to 5 per 
cent (in favour of males). While the literature tends to emphasize the role played by the 
comuni, in particular to their inability to provide education services due to lack of resources, 
preliminary elaborations on the reports by ministerial inspectors suggest that an important 
role was played by their inertia or “lack of incentives”. This holds particularly in the 
Southern regions, while in the Centre-North it seems that the obstacles of the territory (lack 
of infrastructure and climatic conditions) were the single most important impediment to 
school attendance. 
5.2  Human Development Index 
In 1979 Morris David Morris wrote a book in which he introduced a new composite 
index of human development – the Physical Quality of Life Index (PQLI) – computed by 
combining three social indicators, literacy, infant mortality and life expectancy. By now it is 
clear that Morris’ book was an influential one. His effort to capture the multidimensionality 
of human development by aggregating multiple elementary socio-economic indicators into a 
scalar measure prompted an industry-wide investigation of alternative composite indices 
(Ravallion 2010). The most popular one is probably the Human Development Index (HDI), 
which was launched in 1990 in the UNDP’s Human Development Report. Since then, the 
HDI has been the centrepiece of the HDRs for 21 years, and the latest edition includes HDI 
rankings for 169 countries (Stanton 2007). 
The HDI measures the average achievement in human developments in a country by 
taking a simple unweighted mean of three indicators: the logarithm of income per capita LY, 
life expectancy at birth L, and education E. Income is taken in logarithms “… in order to 
reflect diminishing returns to transforming income into human capabilities” (Anand and Sen 
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1994, p. 10); until 2010 it was measured by GDP, but it is now measured by GNI. The 
indicator for education is itself a composite index. Prior to 2010 it combined adult literacy 
with a two-third weight, and gross enrolment in primary, secondary and tertiary schools, 
with a one-third weight. Since 2010, it combines, with equal weights, the mean years of 
schooling and the expected years of schooling, i.e. the “number of years of schooling that a 
child of school entrance age can expect to receive if prevailing patterns of age-specific 
enrolment rates were to stay the same throughout the child’s life” (UNDP 2010, p. 223). 
Elementary indices are normalised by taking the proportional country’s achievement over a 
prefixed scale.  
The new HDI introduced in 2010 is based on the geometric mean of the elementary 
indicators, while the old HDI used an arithmetic mean. Owing to this change, which has 
removed the assumption of perfect substitutability, the new HDI tends to penalise 
unbalanced development in the various dimensions. More formally, the old formula is 
HDI=(L*+E*+LY*)/3, while the new formula is HDI=(L*E*LY*)
1/3, where L*, E* and LY* 
are the normalised values calculated by taking the difference between the actual value and 
the minimum value as a ratio of the difference between maximum and minimum values. In 
either formulations, HDI varies between 0 and 1. In the revision also maximum and 
minimum values were partly revised. According to UNDP’s estimates, in 2010 Italy ranked 
23 in a list comprising 169 countries (below than many other European countries – even 
below Spain and Greece – but better than the UK, Austria and Portugal). Italy’s position in 
the international ranking has barely changed during the previous 30 years.
20  
Economic historians have practiced the art of HDI-making quite extensively. With 
regard to Italy, contributions include Crafts (1997), Conte, della Torre and Vasta (2007), 
Felice (2007) and Prados de la Escosura (2010).
21 In this chapter, we have exploited new 
data recently made available by Vecchi (2011) to construct the HDI series for the entire 150-
year period (Figure 16). All in all, the new series does not add much to what we knew from 
previous estimates. Human development unfolds over time following an approximately 
linear path, disrupted by the two world wars, and dented by episodes in which the HDI pace 
slows down (e.g. during the interwar years) or accelerates (e.g. post-WWII recovery). If we 
use, as the UNDP does, the values of 0.5 and 0.8, as cut-off values for categorizing countries 
of “low”, “medium” and “high” human development, we come up with a clear periodization 
for the 150 years since unification. Italy succeeds in escaping the low human development 
area only in the early 1930s, while it moves to the high human development area relatively 
late, in the mid 1980s.
22 
In Figure 17 Italy’s long-run performance is compared to that of other countries, a task 
made possible thanks to the data kindly made available to us by Prados de la Escosura. The 
                                                 
20 For historical analysis, UNDP (2010) relies on a “hybrid HDI”, which feeds the old income and education 
indicators into the new functional form (1b). This choice is motivated partly with the suitability of old 
indicators to assess past progress, partly with data availability (Gidwitz et al. 2010). 
21 Federico and Toniolo (1991) pioneered the use of composite indices by estimating the PQLI for Italy and a 
few other countries. 
22 Wolff, Chong and Auffhammer (2008) warns against the use of such thresholds: they show that data error in 
aggregate indicators can be devastating. 
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series shown in Figure 15 are based on the “improved” human development index (IHDI), 
derived by applying Kakwani’s (1993) convex achievement function to the usual dimensions 
(longevity, education and income) and using a geometric average to combine them into a 
scalar indicator. Italy’s IHDI has been computed by the authors, while the series for the 
regional aggregates are from Prados de la Escosura (2010). Two facts stand out. First, at the 
time of unification, Italy’s human development gap with the OECD countries (a label used to 
denote Western Europe and its offshoots plus Japan) was remarkably large, in the order of 50 
percent. This implies that the distance between the peripheral Italy and the “core” countries 
when measured by a composite index is larger than GDP per capita comparisons would 
suggest. Going beyond the GDP emphasizes Italy’s backwardness at the onset of modern 
economic growth. Second, although Figure 15 clearly identifies Italy’s secular convergence, 
the pace of the process is slow, dramatically slow. Until 1900 the gap between Italy and 
OECD (as measured by the ratio of the IHDIs) fluctuated around 60 per cent; the gap shrank 
during the first decade of the 20
th century, when it reached 70 percent, but failed to improve 
during the interwar years. The catching up resumed from the 1960s, but it took another half a 
century before convergence was fully achieved. 
5.3  Summing up 
 School gross enrolment rates improved over time, but the process was strikingly 
slow. In addition to the issue of how many pupils were going to school, other indicators 
suggest that, in the case of Italy, the poor quality of school system might be responsible for 
this modest performance: literacy rates, especially those of individuals aged 15-19, have 
increased very slowly, with wide regional disparities. When education indicators are 
combined with life expectancy and GDP per capita, the resulting Human Development Index 
identifies a smooth, nearly-linear progress over time. 
6.  When did it occur that Italians became well-off? 
  Perusal of the literature reveals that, until recently, GDP has been the main tool to 
track the well-being of Italians.
23 The Italian historiography has been distinctly GDP-centric. 
Despite the awareness that GDP can only serve as a proxy for monitoring the change in 
average living standards, scholars have been happy with the GDP and did not feel the need 
to look for alternative measures (Vecchi 2003). Why this affection for the GDP? In addition 
to the usual reasons (most notably, GDP data are easily available), a significant role was 
probably played by the so-called “trickle-down theorem”, that is the idea that GDP growth is 
the only thing to be concerned with, since some of the increased income will – sooner or 
later – trickle down from the rich to the poor (Rosenstein-Rodan 1943; Dollar and Kraay 
2002). As a consequence, the progress of social indicators follows that of GDP. This view 
was supported by the empirical evidence of a high and positive correlation of GDP with a 
number of other development indicators. Thus, why bother about the latter?  
If we stick to this tradition, we reach the conclusion the new GDP series does not add 
much to the long-run picture based on previous, second-generation estimates (Fenoaltea 
2003). Figure 18 shows that the level of GDP per capita attained after 150 years of history is 
                                                 
23 There are exceptions, of course. See the references listed in Vecchi (2003, 2011). 
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the outcome of a “great leap in the short century” (Toniolo and Vecchi 2010). With the 
advantage of the historical perspective, the hotly debated acceleration during the Giolitti’s 
years (1901-1913) is dwarfed by the take off starting in the aftermath of World War II. The 
so-called Italian “economic miracle” was part of a broader phenomenon involving other 
European countries, e.g. a “miracle” experienced by Western Europe, which caught up with 
the US. During the last two decades, however, Italy failed to keep the pace with other 
countries and fell behind most of them.  
The well-being of Italians cannot be summarized solely by the GDP dynamics. There 
is much more to be learned beyond the GDP. By conceptualizing the well-being as an 
inherently multidimensional phenomenon, we have constructed a dashboard of indicators, 
that helps to identify the timing, in particular the turning points, of the long-run evolution of 
the well-being of Italians (Figure 19). Each graph in the figure compares the dynamics of 
one dimension of well-being (e.g. life expectancy) with that of GDP, after normalising each 
indicator into the (0,1) interval: 0 is the value of the welfare indicator in 1861, 1 is the value 
in the most recent available year, and any intermediate values can be interpreted as a 
measure of the progress, expressed in percentage terms. The shape of the curve, especially 
its curvature, reveals the extent to which a given indicator correlates with GDP per capita: 
the higher the (positive) correlation between the welfare indicator measured on the y-axis 
and GDP (x-axis), the more the curve is close to the 45-degree line which ideally links the 
bottom-left to the top-right corner. Vice versa, a steep curve suggests that the welfare 
indicator improves far more rapidly than GDP. 
The first comment is on health outcomes, probably the domain of Italy’s most brilliant 
achievements. The graph in the top-left corner illustrates the progress of life expectancy 
relatively to per capita GDP. Using jubilees as benchmark years (vertical lines in the graph) 
it clearly stands out that the conquest of longevity has been much faster than the conquest of 
prosperity: in 1911 GDP had reached 5 per cent of the level observed in 2010, while in 1911 
life expectancy had already covered 30 per cent of the 2010 level. Similarly, in 1961 GDP 
had increased up to 25 per cent of the 2010 level, compared to 75 per cent for life 
expectancy. Overall, the graph is very effective in showing how GDP per capita under-
estimate well-being during the first century following Italy’s unification, as it fails to capture 
the swift gains in longevity of the population. On the other hand, the graph leads to revalue 
the gains in well-being ensued after the Golden Age: exactly half of the total distance 
covered by per capita GDP during the past 150 years takes place between 1971 and today. 
The spectacular raise in life expectancy during the first century of Italy’s history is largely 
explained by the fall in infant mortality. It is worth reminding that in 1861 the median age at 
death was less than 5 years for boys and 7 years for girls. There is no country in the world 
today where half of the population dies at such astonishingly young ages. In 1911, the 
median age at death in Italy reached 28.7 years for males and 31.5 years for females, a 
remarkable improvement (both in absolute terms and compared to the growth rate of GDP 
per capita, which grew by an average 0.8 per cent per year). In 1961, median age at death 
was 67.7 for males and 72.9 for females. Underlying the process of death’s postponement is 
the reduction of infant mortality, as clearly shown by the second left panel from the top in 
Figure 19. 
As far as education outcomes are concerned, in Figure 19 we consider two sets of 
indicators, namely school enrolment rates and adult literacy rates. In the case of Italy, 
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eradication of illiteracy among adults required an extraordinary long time to be completed 
and the process was largely independent of the GDP level. In 1951, about 80 per cent of 
Italians adults could read and write, while GDP per capita was 15 per cent of its final level. 
Confronting the remaining 20 per cent of illiterate adults required another 60 years, a time 
during which GDP per capita multiplied by a factor of 6. In sum, GDP per capita did not 
help much to teach Italians to read and write. 
Gross enrolment rates tell different stories, depending on the level of education. 
Primary school enrolment rates improved impressively fast, during a period (1861-1931) in 
which the increase in per capita GDP was lethargic.
24 After World War II, Italy’s population 
of primary school age (6-10 years) was enrolled: Figure 19 shows that the GER exceeds the 
100 per cent ceiling for a number of decades (from the 1920s until the late 1970s – early 
1980s), a consequence of the presence of pupils repeating grades and above age children. 
With reference to secondary education, enrolment rates show a strong positive correlation 
with GDP, with a nearly-linear timing, that is, education tracks closely GDP’s advances. 
Interestingly, tertiary education enrolment rates appear to be persistently insensitive to 
changes in the GDP (and vice versa). In 1961, after a whole century had passed since the 
time of unification, the GER for tertiary school was only 10 per cent of the value it would 
have in 2010, compared to 25 per cent for GDP. Enrolment rates advanced at a slower pace 
than GDP until the mid 1980s; thereafter, a dramatic acceleration brought the GER at 40.5 
per cent in 2008. The somehow paradoxical nature of this pattern has been emphasized by 
Bertola and Sestito (2011) – “For the period after 1990, ... Italy’s overall growth 
performance was, at less than 1% yearly average, the second slowest (only ahead of 
Switzerland) in the 12-countries comparison group”. The fact that tertiary GERs increase 
exactly when productivity slows down corroborates the Bertola and Sestito’s claim 
according to which the slowdown of Italy’s economy since the 1990s may partly reflect its 
educational system’s quality deterioration.
25 
7.  Some concluding remarks 
“Backwardness” is probably the term that best summarizes Italy’s socio-economic 
conditions at the time of the country’s political and administrative unification (Toniolo 
1988). The well-being of Italians was not only far-off from the level reached today, but also 
much lower than that of the citizens of most developed countries. In the first part of the 
paper we have examined a range of indicators which helped evaluating the extent of the 
Italian progress since unification, as well as the timing of this progress. 
Approaching the first jubilee year of Italy’s unification, Mr. Paolo Carcano, Minister 
of Economy and Finance in the third Giolitti’s government, expressed both satisfaction for 
the objectives achieved and optimism for Italy’s future prospects: 
“It is from the whole of the gathered elements that I feel confident to look with hope to 
the next future, and to foresee a new significant improvement of the general conditions 
                                                 
24 In interpreting the graph some caution is due to the limitation of the gross enrolment rate as an education 
outcome. All this probably leads to overestimate the speed of the progress which brought kids into classrooms. 
See also A’Hearn, Auria and Vecchi (2011) and Bertola and Sestito (2011). 
25 Ciocca (2007) stressed how the productivity turnaround after mid 1990s was historically unprecedented. 
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of our country. Not as rich as many superficial and optimist minds would it like to be, 
but not even as miser as all those mourning at a minor difficulty often suggest. The 
country works and learns. As the first steps  are often the most difficult ones, the 
progress achieved over not such as a long period of time encourages us to be positive 
about our future. Memories of the past warm our hearts and spur us to do our best” 
(Carcano 1909, pp. 46-47).  
The evidence discussed in this paper provides unambiguous support to Mr. Carcano’s 
assessment. In fact, according to the dynamics of non-monetary welfare indicators the 
improvement in living standards of Italians turns out even rosier than that depicted by the 
financial and economic indicators accessible to the Minister. 
The findings reviewed in the paper are rich of implications for Liberal Italy (1861-
1913). First, the well-being of Italians is severely underestimated if measured by per capita 
GDP. Many indicators, including health and education outcomes, improved dramatically vis-
à-vis a gentle increase in average national income. Other indicators were sluggish in their 
dynamics, despite rapid economic growth. Second, improvements have been both in absolute 
terms (e.g. Italy in 1911 vs. Italy in 1861) and in relative terms (e.g. Italy vs. other 
comparable countries). We found no evidence of “dark satanic mills” during Italy’s 
industrialization (Williamson 1981), at least in the aggregate indicators. Third, if we use the 
GDP’s yardstick for the standard of living we reach the conclusion that during the late 19th 
century globalization, with its unprecedented movements of capital and labour across 
national frontiers (Williamson 1996), Italy failed to converge with the leading countries. 
However, adopting other non-monetary based welfare measures that conclusion is 
sometimes reversed: Italy did succeed in catching up with the leaders in life expectancy and 
infant mortality. The question “convergence of what?” is therefore a non-trivial one when 
investigating gainers and losers in the process of globalization. Fourth, the average living 
conditions of Italians improved relatively fast without a deterioration of its distribution. 
Unlike in other countries, in Italy income inequality did not increase, nor did other welfare 
indicators, such as heights and health outcomes, ever reversed their ascending trend. The 
regional analysis carried out in Vecchi (2011) shows that between 1861 and 1911 the 
improvement in the living conditions spread across the country. In particular, the 
Mezzogiorno tremendously improved its conditions during the decades subsequent the 
unification. All this addresses some of the key issues raised by Federico (1996) and sheds 
new light on Italy’s economic development: we can no longer say, with Federico, that Italy’s 
success story is a little-known one. 
The Great War stopped Italy’s catching up. During the interwar years, Fascist Italy 
opted for autarchy thereby partaking in the world-wise process of deglobalization. The 
trends of all indicators during the Ventennio show that the well-being of Italians did not 
benefit from this choice; while GDP per capita continued to grow in parallel with other 
countries, the march towards better living standards slowed down. In fact, now and then it 
even came to a halt: child work, for instance, increased during the recovery from the Great 
Depression (1931-1936). Inequality appears to have risen too – only slightly according to the 
estimates based on households’ incomes, more sizeably in terms of consumption according 
to Rossi, Toniolo and Vecchi (2011). After estimating the “growth incidence curve” 
(Ravallion and Chen 2003) for the years 1921-31, Amendola, Salsano and Vecchi (2011) 




growth, with most benefits accruing to the richest 20-30 per cent of the population. The 
geographical gap between the North and the South widened: it happened for life expectancy 
at birth and infant mortality (Atella, Francisci and Vecchi 2011) and for the heights of 
conscripts (A’Hearn and Vecchi 2011). The combination of two world wars, the most severe 
economic crisis ever experienced in modern times and the autarchic strategy negatively 
affected the trend of welfare indicators, but all in all the well-being of Italians kept rising, if 
more slowly. 
In the immediate aftermath of World War II, standard of livings in Italy deteriorated 
dramatically. Hunger became widespread: according to Sorrentino and Vecchi (2011), half 
of the population was undernourished during the years 1946-47. In 1951 a Commissione 
parlamentare d’inchiesta was set up and assigned the task of investigating the extent and 
nature of poverty in the country. Irrespective of the indicator used to measure the incidence 
and depth of destitution, both the evidence of a large-scale survey and the qualitative 
accounts were as gloomy as in late 19th century investigations. Italy had undoubtedly 
tumbled in the past. The recovery was impressively fast, however, and was paralleled by a 
profound transformation of the society and the lifestyle of Italians; in the 1950s and 1960s, 
economic performance was indeed extraordinary by historical standards, though less so by 
international standards. The North-South GDP gap narrowed significantly, this being the 
only episode of convergence during 140 years for which GDP estimates are available 
separately by macro regions (Brunetti, Felice and Vecchi 2011).  
The findings of the paper also lead to an interesting reappraisal of the 1970s. Despite 
the complexity of those years – afflicted by harsh social conflicts, terrorism, political 
turbulence, two major oil crises, and high international instability – economic growth 
remained well above 3 per cent per year and was distinctly “pro-poor”, particularly in the 
Northern regions (Lombardo 2011): both inflation and unemployment rose considerably, but 
income inequality and absolute poverty fell considerably, in line with Rossi’s (2007) 
analysis of the functional distributional of income. As stressed by Rossi and Toniolo (1996), 
however, the 1970s left many problems unresolved, most importantly those linked to the 
structural reforms required to foster and sustain future economic growth. The solution found 
in the 1980s enabled Italians to further improve their living standards by fuelling welfare 
expenditures (Conte, Rossi and Vecchi 2011; Ferrera 1984), but at the price of a public debt 
soaring from 51 per cent of GDP in 1982 to 102 per cent in 1990. Current well-being was 
being traded against the well-being of future generations. 
The currency crisis of 1992 marks a turning point in the trend of the well-being. After 
130 years of economic growth accompanied by a narrowing income distribution, Italy 
entered a phase characterised by low economic growth, persistently high inequality and 
increasing sense of vulnerability (Boeri and Brandolini 2004; Brandolini 2005; Rossi and 
Vecchi 2011). The welfare levels achieved in the present day may not be necessarily enjoyed 
by future generations (Brandolini and D’Alessio 2011). At 150 years since unification, the 
sense of accomplishment for the success in heading the country “from the periphery to the 
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Table 1 – Income distribution statistics 
 
Year  Sample size 
(households) 
Mean per 









index            
ε=1 
Atkinson 
index            
ε=2 
1861  1,234  1,461  68.9  0.504  0.063  0.346  0.503 
1871  1,614  1,557  74.2  0.450  0.045  0.285  0.451 
1881  1,550  1,687  74.6  0.472  0.054  0.307  0.456 
1891  1,983  1,730  71.5  0.473  0.057  0.308  0.450 
1901  1,597  1,901  71.7  0.486  0.054  0.328  0.506 
1911  1,427  2,139  70.1  0.460  0.047  0.299  0.476 
1921  1,562  2,317  71.3  0.451  0.050  0.285  0.431 
1931  2,274  2,366  65.0  0.449  0.043  0.295  0.495 
1948  10,732  4,069  106.7  0.416  0.044  0.250  0.381 
1967  3,140  4,006  36.5  0.391  0.034  0.234  0.414 
1968  3,277  4,171  35.7  0.408  0.036  0.245  0.419 
1969  3,118  4,574  37.0  0.397  0.034  0.233  0.401 
1970  3,297  4,597  35.2  0.383  0.031  0.220  0.392 
1971  6,035  4,841  36.6  0.397  0.034  0.241  0.432 
1972  5,889  5,012  36.7  0.385  0.032  0.226  0.405 
1973  5,175  6,507  44.8  0.401  0.035  0.239  0.412 
1974  4,605  6,673  43.8  0.391  0.032  0.233  0.419 
1975  4,445  6,588  44.5  0.353  0.026  0.192  0.356 
1977  2,915  8,008  49.7  0.358  0.028  0.191  0.329 
1978  3,044  8,189  49.4  0.329  0.024  0.165  0.297 
1979  2,886  9,126  52.2  0.361  0.029  0.196  0.339 
1980  2,980  9,366  51.9  0.332  0.024  0.166  0.289 
1981  4,091  8,678  47.8  0.315  0.021  0.150  0.268 
1982  3,967  8,891  48.8  0.297  0.018  0.133  0.241 
1983  4,107  8,965  48.6  0.300  0.019  0.137  0.249 
1984  4,172  9,670  50.8  0.321  0.022  0.156  0.279 
1986  8,022  9,175  45.6  0.307  0.020  0.145  0.267 
1987  8,027  9,974  48.1  0.318  0.022  0.157  0.287 
1989  8,274  11,375  50.9  0.300  0.019  0.137  0.248 
1991  8,188  11,775  51.0  0.305  0.020  0.142  0.256 
1993  8,089  11,061  48.0  0.328  0.023  0.168  0.312 
1995  8,135  11,291  46.7  0.331  0.023  0.171  0.317 
1998  7,147  12,230  48.5  0.342  0.026  0.183  0.336 
2000  8,001  12,816  48.3  0.333  0.024  0.174  0.322 
2002  8,011  13,461  49.7  0.328  0.023  0.168  0.312 
2004  8,012  15,164  56.0  0.351  0.027  0.189  0.336 
2006  7,768  15,807  57.6  0.337  0.025  0.175  0.319 
2008  7,977  15,283  56.5  0.327  0.023  0.165  0.305 
 
Sources: authors’ elaborations on data from IHBD-II (1861-1931), Doxa (1948) and SHIW (tabulations 1967-

















Source: authors’ elaboration. 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Maddison (2010) and Conference Board (2011); underlying values 
are in 1990 international Geary-Khamis dollars. Data for Italy in 1915-1920 are adjusted on the basis of the 
new BIU series. 
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Figure 3: Population structure in Italy (thousands of persons) 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on Istat demographic statistics. Figures as of 31st December. 
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Figure 5: The incidence of child work in Italy (share of economically 
















Source: Toniolo and Vecchi (2007) on census data. 
 
 



















Source: authors’ elaboration on data from: Huberman: Huberman (2004), Tab. 6, p. 982, industrial 
manual workers; Zamagni: 1911-18: Zamagni (1975), Tab. 1, p. 532, industrial manual workers, 
hours of work per day multiplied by 6×30/7×12; 1919-39: Zamagni (1994), industrial manual 
workers, hours of work per month multiplied by 12; ML: Ministero del Lavoro’s survey of industrial 
establishments with at least 10 employees (50 since 1978), industrial manual workers; Istat, SCI: 
Istat’s survey of firms with at least 50 employees, industrial manual workers; Istat, NA: Istat’s 
national accounts (from EU-KLEMS for 1970-79), all industrial employees; CB: Conference Board 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Conference Board (2011). 
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Source: authors’ elaborations. μ is GDP per capita, A is the Atkinson index calculated for the value 
of ε indicated in parentheses and G is the Gini index. 
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Source: authors’ elaborations. μ is GDP per capita, A is the Atkinson index calculated for ε=2 and G is 
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Source: Atella, Francisci and Vecchi (2011). 
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Source: authors’ elaboration. The years 1914-19 and 1940-45 (except for Spain) were eliminated to 





Figure 13: Infant mortality rate in selected countries (deaths within first year 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Mitchell (2008). 
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Source: authors’ elaboration. GDP is GDP per capita, LEA-GDP is life-expectancy-adjusted GDP per capita 
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Source: authors’ elaboration on data from Lindert (2007). 
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Figure 17: Improved Human Development Index in Italy, the OECD 
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Sources. Italy: authors’ elaboration; OECD (comprising Western Europe and its offshoots, the USA, 
Canada, Australia and New Zealand plus Japan) and World: Prados de la Escosura (2010). 
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